Asbestos and Mass Torts with Fraudulent Victims by Hylton, Keith
Boston University School of Law 
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law 
Faculty Scholarship 
2008 
Asbestos and Mass Torts with Fraudulent Victims 
Keith Hylton 
Boston Univeristy School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Keith Hylton, Asbestos and Mass Torts with Fraudulent Victims, 37 Southwestern Law Review 575 (2008). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/670 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access 
by Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of 
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty 
Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarly 
Commons at Boston University School of Law. For more 
information, please contact lawlessa@bu.edu.  
  
BOSTON UNIVERSITY 
SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
WORKING PAPER SERIES, LAW AND ECONOMICS 
WORKING PAPER NO. 08-05 
 
 
 
 
 
ASBESTOS AND MASS TORTS WITH FRAUDULENT VICTIMS 
 
KEITH N. HYLTON 
 
 
 
Forthcoming Southwestern Law Review, “Perspectives on Asbestos Litigation” Symposium 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded without charge at: 
 
The Boston University School of Law Working Paper Series Index: 
http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/2008.html 
 
The Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection 
http://ssrn.com/abstract_ID=1088399  
 
 1
 
 
 
 
 
 
Asbestos and Mass Torts with Fraudulent Victims 
 
 
Keith N. Hylton∗ 
 
 
 
 
forthcoming, Southwestern Law Review 
“Perspectives on Asbestos Litigation” symposium. 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: Deterrence and compensation goals should be distinguished, and 
compensation priorities should change in response to the deterrence goal.  This 
has immediate implications for the problem of handling marginal and fraudulent 
claims in asbestos litigation.  Where the deterrence goals come to the forefront, 
for example in instances of reckless exposure, it may be desirable for courts to 
require defendants to pay damages that are not transferred to any claimants.  
Where the deterrence goals are less compelling, as in instances of ordinary 
negligence, the importance of weeding out marginal and fraudulent claims 
becomes paramount.  I consider optimal penalties for attorneys who bundle 
fraudulent claims. 
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The asbestos crisis, from the perspective of those who have not studied it 
carefully, has looked something like a massive black hole that swallows up large 
chunks of the lives of the lawyers, judges, and scholars who have come within its 
gravitational field.  It seems to raise unique issues and to require the development 
of special procedures.  Looking on it from a distance, one wonders whether there 
are general lessons to be gleaned from the crisis. 
 
Of possible theoretical approaches, there are three that have been applied to the 
asbestos crisis.  One is the justice approach, which as the name suggests involves 
a search for justice in asbestos litigation.1  Justice is an elusive concept in 
litigation, and especially in the case of asbestos.  Would a search for justice 
involve specifying compensation amounts that victims should receive, or the 
specification of fair procedures?  Aggregate litigation could advance the search 
for justice in allocations by ensuring that like cases are treated alike, but might 
retard the procedural justice goal by failing to give each claim its full 
consideration in court. 
 
Another approach focuses on the goal of compensation, of making sure that each 
victim of asbestos exposure is compensated for the harms suffered.  In recognition 
of scarce resources, the compensation approach focuses on ensuring that victims 
are prioritized according to the severity of their injuries.2  Victims who suffer 
mesothelioma should come first, followed by victims of asbestosis, and then 
victims with various gradations of pleural disease.3  While compensation is an 
excellent goal, provided the injuries are genuine, one wonders why the litigation 
process should be preferred to a broader legislative solution.  The litigation 
process involves enormous administrative and transaction costs that drain almost 
a third of the dollars set aside to compensate asbestos victims.4 
 
A third general approach to the asbestos crisis, which is a distant third in terms of 
frequency of mention, is the goal of efficient resource allocation.  Under the 
assumption that the asbestos claims that lawyers have filed over the years of this 
crisis involve cases of intentional or negligent harm, rather than inevitable 
                                                 
1 Jack B. Weinstein, Individual Justice in Mass Tort Litigation (1995). 
2 See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, The Worst Should Go First: Deferral Registries in Asbestos 
Litigation, 15 Harv. J. L & Pub. Policy 541 (1992). 
3 For a discussion of asbestos related diseases, see http://www.medicinenet.com/asbestos-
related_disorders/page6.htm.  
4 Stephen J. Carroll et al., Asbestos Litigation Rand xxvi (RAND Inst. For Civil Justice 2005) 
[hereafter Asbestos Litigation, RAND], available at 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG162.pdf.  (“Defense transaction costs 
include the costs defendants and insurers incurred in all asbestos-related litigation, including 
litigation with other defendants and insurers. These costs amounted to more than $21 billion by 
the end of 2002, or about 31 percent of total spending.”) 
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accidents, asbestos litigation should be treated as a mechanism for efficiently 
regulating the conduct of injuring firms.  The lawsuits should serve the goal of 
efficient deterrence by setting up incentives for firms to minimize the risks 
imposed on employees and consumers. 
 
This essay will focus on the efficient regulation approach.  The efficient 
regulation approach has received too little attention in recent years as the 
emphasis has been placed on ensuring compensation for asbestos victims.  But the 
tort system’s comparative advantage is as a regulatory mechanism rather than a 
compensation system.5  If compensation is the most important goal at hand, that 
can be accomplished at far less cost through some administrative system that does 
not involve litigation.  And if the claims for injury based on asbestos exposure are 
not simply inevitable accidents, then there is clearly a need for a regulatory 
mechanism to ensure that mass torts such as asbestos do not continue to occur. 
 
I will start with a discussion of deterrence principles in the context of mass torts 
and then work my way gradually to the asbestos problem.  One message I hope to 
convey is the importance of keeping deterrence and compensation goals distinct, 
and recognizing that compensation priorities should change in response to the 
deterrence goal.  This has immediate implications for the current problem of 
handling marginal and fraudulent claims in asbestos litigation.  Where the 
deterrence goals come to the forefront, for example in instances of reckless 
exposure, courts should be careful to distinguish deterrence and compensation 
goals; which may require defendants to pay damages that are not transferred to 
any claimants.  Where the deterrence goals are less compelling, as in the instances 
of ordinary negligence or even less culpable conduct observed in modern cases, 
the importance of weeding out marginal and fraudulent claims becomes 
paramount. 
 
A Little Background 
 
Although I will focus on deterrence principles and only touch on details of the 
asbestos crisis, it is worthwhile to note a few general features of the crisis.  
Asbestos was considered a miracle product for centuries for its ability to 
withstand heat and retard fire.6   As early as the 1920s, scientists began to 
                                                 
5 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 96 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1881). 
6 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asbestos (“The Greeks termed asbestos the "miracle mineral" 
because of its soft and pliant properties, as well as its ability to withstand heat.  Asbestos became 
increasingly popular among manufacturers and builders in the late 19th century due to its 
resistance to heat, electricity and chemical damage, sound absorption and tensile strength.”) 
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recognize its dangerous attributes.7  Microscopic asbestos fibers can be inhaled 
easily and remain in the respiratory system, where they cause diseases such as 
mesothelioma, asbestosis, and various degrees of pleural degeneration.8 
 
The stylized facts of the crisis can be summarized quickly.  The major producers 
of asbestos hid the facts about the risks of exposure for decades.9  As evidence of 
this conduct became available, plaintiffs’ lawyers brought waves of lawsuits 
against the producers involving claims of intentional or reckless conduct and 
generating punitive damage verdicts.10  The major producers have been driven out 
of business by lawsuits and the remaining defendants today are largely businesses 
that produced products that used asbestos, and who at best may be considered 
negligent for failing to investigate or to act quickly to reduce the exposure risk to 
employees or customers.11 
 
We therefore have classes of defendant ranging from those who engaged in 
conduct that can be described as intentional or reckless, to those who may have 
negligently failed to investigate the risk, and even those who are arguably less 
culpable.  We have classes of plaintiff ranging from those facing a high risk of 
death from mesothelioma, to fraudulent claimants who have so suffered no harm 
at all.  
 
This is not the place for revisionism on the asbestos crisis, but some data suggest 
that the real story of asbestos is a bit more complicated than the stylized facts.  As 
of 2002, 700,000 individuals had filed lawsuits in the U.S. and the total amount 
that defendants and insurers had paid to resolve claims was $70 billion.12  
However, it has been suggested as a rough estimate that 400,000 lives were saved 
                                                 
7 Michelle J. White, Asbestos and the Future of Mass Torts, at 2, NBER Working Paper 10308, 
February 2004, available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w10308.  
8 See, e.g. Asbestos Litigation, RAND, supra note 4, at 13-14.  The types of pleural degeneration 
caused by asbestos exposure have been described as “pleural plaques, pleural thickening, and 
pleural effusion”, id. at 14 (“Asbestos can cause other nonmalignant abnormalities of the pleura: 
pleural plaques and thickening, and pleural effusion. Pleural plaques and thickening are scarring of 
the pleura, the membrane that lines the inside of the chest wall and covers the outside of the lungs. 
Pleural effusion is the presence of liquid in the pleural space. Pleural plaques and thickening can 
be diagnosed by a chest X-ray and can be accompanied by symptoms and diminished pulmonary 
function.”) 
9 See, e.g., Asbestos Litigation, RAND, supra note 4, at 12; White, supra note 7, at 5-6; Paul 
Brodeur, Expendable Americans (New York: Viking Press, 1973). 
10 White, supra note 6, at 5-6. 
11 See, e.g., Helen E. Freedman, Selected Ethical Issues in Asbestos Litigation, Southwestern 
Asbestos Symposium paper, at 2, forthcoming Southwestern Law Review (2008). 
12 See Asbestos Litigation Costs, Compensation, and Alternatives, RAND Research Brief, at 1, 
available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/2005/RAND_RB9155.pdf; Asbestos 
Litigation, RAND, supra note 4, at xxiv - xxvi. 
 5
due to asbestos’s ability to retard fires between 1942 and 1995.13  If we assign a 
value of $7.5 million to each of these lives saved,14 then the benefit from asbestos 
suggested by this admittedly imprecise estimate of lives saved during the latter 
half of the 1900s is on the order of $3 trillion – and this excludes the presumably 
more substantial life-saving impact over the first half of the 1900s.  I am aware of 
no careful cost-benefit analysis of asbestos, but it appears possible that the benefit 
from asbestos exceeded its cost.  And, if given the choice, most people would 
choose reduced lung capacity over death from fire. 
 
But this is all water under the bridge now.  Asbestos may be a product that has 
saved more lives than it has destroyed, but at this stage society is focusing only on 
the downside.  My approach here is to take the downside perspective as valid and 
to apply deterrence principles to it. 
 
Deterrence and Mass Torts 
 
General Principles of Deterrence and Aggregate Litigation 
 
The problem of creating economically optimal incentives for precaution in the 
mass torts setting is closely related to the more familiar economic analysis of 
damage awards.15  In the punitive damages context, scholars have examined the 
problem of deterrence in connection to repeated torts.16  Repeated torts raise the 
same economic issues as mass torts. 
 
Suppose, for example, a tortfeasor imposes a harm of $100 on one victim every 
day.  Suppose the cost of suit is $10 for half of his victims (the ones injured on 
odd-numbered days) and $200 for the other half of victims (the ones injured on 
even-numbered days).  Given this, only half of the victims will bring suit against 
the tortfeasor.  Since only half of the victims will bring suit (the ones for whom 
the cost of suit is $10), the tortfeasor will not have optimal incentives to take 
precaution or to avoid harming victims.  If he avoids the imposing the harm he 
                                                 
13 Rachel Maines, Asbestos and Fire: Technological Tradeoffs and the Body at Risk 18 (2005). 
14 This is a reasonable estimate based on studies of the value of a statistical life.  See, e.g., Joseph 
E. Aldy and W. Kip Viscusi, Age Differences in the Value of Statistical Life: Revealed Preference 
Evidence, at 23 (presenting table of age-specific value for the “value of a statistical life”). 
15 See generally, Keith N. Hylton, Reflections on Remedies and Philip Morris v. Williams, 
forthcoming, The Review of Litigation, 2008, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=977998. 
16 A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 
Harvard Law Review 869 (1998) (proposing that in repeated harm setting, the punitive award 
should be determined by dividing the judgment by the probability of liability); Keith N. Hylton, 
Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 Georgetown Law Journal 421 (1998) 
(in repeated harm setting, the punitive award should be determined either by the defendant’s gain 
divided by the probability of liability or the victim’s loss divided by the probability of liability).  
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suffers a loss of $70.  If he imposes the harm he suffers a loss of $50 due to 
liability ($100 multiplied by the 50% probability that his victim will sue).  
Clearly, he will impose the harm, which is bad from a resource allocation 
perspective because society suffers a loss of $100 each day rather than the $70 
cost of avoidance.  I will refer to this as the underdeterrence outcome. 
 
Punitive damages have been proposed as one solution to the underdetterence 
outcome in the repetitive harm scenario.17  If the total damage award of each 
victim who sues the torfeasor is multiplied to $200, then optimal incentives will 
be created by the tort system in this scenario.  If the damage award is set at $200, 
then each time the tortfeasor imposes a loss on a victim he will expect to pay $100 
($200 multiplied by the 50% probability that his victim will sue).  The optimal 
multiplier is generally equal to the reciprocal of the probability that the tortfeasor 
will be held liable.18 
 
Another solution to the underdeterrence outcome in the repetitive harm scenario is 
aggregate litigation.19  The aggregate litigation approach (exemplified by the 
class action) involves bundling all or many of the claims into one lawsuit.  Since 
the proof problems are the same in each, the cost of litigation can be shared 
among the multiple claims in the aggregate lawsuit.  Thus, if all of the claims are 
bundled, a lawyer can create a class of victims suing for the aggregate loss, at a 
cost of $200.  The economies of scale provided by aggregate litigation offer 
efficiency gains relative to decentralized litigation,20 and also offer a solution to 
the underdeterrence problem when litigation costs exceed claims for some 
victims. 
 
The optimal deterrence approach illustrated in the foregoing example is not so 
much concerned with compensation as with internalizing to the tortfeasor all of 
the harms associated with his conduct.  If the costs of his conduct are internalized 
                                                 
17 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 16. 
18 Id.  However, the Polinsky & Shavell analysis does not take into account the costs of litigation 
as a barrier to lawsuits; see Keith N. Hylton & Thomas J. Miceli, Should Tort Damages be 
Multiplied?, 21 J. Law, Econ. & Org. 388 (2005). 
19 The common example of aggregate litigation is the class action device.  On the economics of 
class actions, see, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Class Actions, in I New Palgrave Dictionary of 
Economics and the Law 257-262 (Peter Newman, ed., Macmillan Press 1998); David Rosenberg, 
Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 Harvard Law 
Review 831 (2002); Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options in the Mass Tort 
Class Action, 115 Harvard Law Review 747 (2002).  However, I am using the term aggregate 
litigation to refer to any process that bundles, consolidates, or aggregates claims into one or a 
small number of lawsuits.  I will use the terms aggregate litigation and class action as if they are 
synonymous in the text.  I know they are not the same, but the differences are not important for 
this analysis. 
20 On scale efficiencies, see Rosenberg, supra note 19. 
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to the tortfeasor, he will take cost-justified precautions to avoid imposing those 
harms.  On the other hand, if the damage judgment against the tortfeasor exceeds 
the value of the victims’ harms, over-internalizing victim losses, the result may be 
overdeterrence of the tortfeasor’s conduct.  The tortfeasor might be forced by the 
threat of liability to take precautions that cost $150 in order to avoid imposing a 
harm of $100.  
 
In general there are two deterrence goals that can be recognized.  One is the 
internalization approach described up to this point.  The other is the complete 
deterrence approach.21 
 
The complete deterrence approach aims to shut down the offensive conduct rather 
than to find an optimal stopping point.22  While the internalization approach aims 
to find the optimal frequency of some harm-causing activity, the complete 
deterrence aims to set the frequency of the activity at zero. 
 
The complete deterrence approach is preferable to the internalization approach in 
two settings.  One is where the injurer’s conduct involves bypassing the market – 
that is, where it is a taking that occurs in a low transaction cost setting.23  When it 
is cheap and easy for the tortfeasor to seek the consent of his victim before taking 
something from the victim, the tortfeasor should be forced to seek consent.  
Complete deterrence in this case means removing any gain the tortfeasor gets 
from bypassing the market. 
 
The other setting in which the complete deterrence approach should be preferred 
to the internalization approach is where the tortfeasor’s activity is always socially 
undesirable,24 in the sense that the social costs of the injurer’s activity far 
outweigh any objective notion of its social value.  An actor who plays with a 
loaded gun on a crowded subway car imposes a risk on others that is objectively 
far in excess of the value of the gain he gets.  The law should seek to completely 
                                                 
21 For discussion of both approaches to deterrence, see Hylton, Punitive Damages and Economic 
Theory of Penalties, supra note 16.  The two approaches are implied, though not explicitly 
discussed, in Gary Becker’s early economic analysis of criminal punishment.  See Gary S. Becker, 
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 Journal of Political Economy 169 (1968).  In 
Becker’s model, setting the penalty equal to the gain to the offender’s gain, which implements the 
complete deterrence goal, is appropriate only when the offender’s gain is less than the victim’s 
harm.  
22 Hylton, supra note 16. 
23 On the market bypassing theory, see Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Criminal Law, 
85 Columbia Law Review 1193 (1985).  The market bypassing theory is equivalent to the property 
rule theory of Calabresi and Melamed, see Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972). 
24 Keith N. Hylton, The Theory of Penalties and the Economics of Criminal Law, 1 Rev. L. & 
Econ. 175, 184 (2005); Posner, supra note 23, at 1201-05. 
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deter the conduct rather than internalize the loss of a victim.  If, for example, an 
enormously wealthy individual who could easily pay the damages suffered by 20 
gunshot victims decides to play with a firearm in a subway car, that actor should 
be penalized at a level that makes it subjectively unprofitable to the actor to 
engage in the activity, rather than simply requiring him to compensate victims. 
 
These broad deterrence principles apply to the repetitive harm setting discussed at 
the outset of this section.  We have two deterrence methods, multiplication and 
aggregation, and two deterrence goals, internalization and complete deterrence.  
This implies an array of four method-goal combinations that can be considered.  
However, rather than considering each of the method-goal combinations in the 
abstract, let us return to the concrete examples. 
 
In the repetitive harm problem examined earlier, I concluded that the punitive 
damages multiplier method and the aggregate litigation method both solved the 
problem of underdeterrence by internalizing victim harms to the tortfeasor.  These 
cases serve as illustrations of the internalization approach. 
 
The complete deterrence approach involves wiping out gains enjoyed by the 
tortfeasor.  In many cases that will be accomplished by the internalization 
approach, though not in all cases.  Moreover, the complete deterrence approach 
implies a different view of the purpose of the damage award. Whereas the 
internalization approach aims to require the tortfeasor to compensate all victims 
for their injuries, the complete deterrence approach aims to ensure that the 
tortfeasor gains nothing from the injury-causing conduct.  
 
To provide an illustration of a setting in which the complete deterrence approach 
is preferable to the internalization approach, suppose the actor invades the 
victim’s property in a setting in which the invader could easily have gained 
permission before the invasion (low transaction costs).  Suppose, for example, the 
tortfeasor uses the garages of victims in order to park his fleet of cars.  The gain to 
the tortfeasor of using someone’s garage is $10 per day.  The loss to the victim is 
trivial; suppose it is only $1 for each invasion.  I will refer to this as the case of 
the efficient invader, because the gain from his invasion exceeds the cost imposed 
on victims.25  This can be viewed as an example of repetitive harm because the 
                                                 
25 One might ask whether there are any real cases with economic structures similar to the “efficient 
invader” example.  Consider Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997).  The 
defendant Steenberg Homes hauled a mobile home across Jacque’s property after being refused 
permission to cross the property.  The only other way Steenberg Homes could have delivered the 
home to its customer would have been to clear a road with as much as seven feet of snow in some 
parts.  Clearly, the harm done to the Jacques was less than the gain (the snow removal cost 
avoided) by Steenberg Homes.  The court awarded a punitive judgment of $100,000 to the 
plaintiffs. 
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tortfeasor uses someone’s garage every day.  Suppose, as in the example of the 
previous part, only half of the victims would have an incentive to bring suit. 
 
Under the internalization approach, the tortfeasor would be required to pay a 
damage award in a single suit of $2 ($1 multiplied by a factor of 2 because only 
half of the victims sue).  However, since the tortfeasor’s gain is $10, the 
internalization approach would not deter his conduct.  Even after paying 
compensatory damages, he still gains $9 on average from every invasion, so he 
will continue to invade victims’ garages.  Alternatively, an aggregate lawsuit 
would impose a damage judgment of $1 multiplied by the number of claimants 
(all victims).  However, the tortfeasor’s gain is $10 multiplied by the number of 
victims.  It follows that he would not be deterred by the aggregate lawsuit. 
 
Under the complete deterrence approach, the court would require a judgment of a 
minimum of $10 multiplied by the number of claimants (all victims) in an 
aggregate lawsuit.  In a single lawsuit, the complete deterrence approach would 
require a judgment of $20 in an individual lawsuit. 
 
Special Incentives under Aggregate Litigation 
 
So far I have considered principles of deterrence in the context of multiple or 
repetitive harms.  In this part, I want to examine the special incentive problems of 
the aggregate harm setting.  
 
The classic example of a case that is ideal for aggregate litigation is a mass tort 
that causes harm to many people at the same time.  Aggregate litigation is ideal as 
a solution to the underdeterrence problem when those harms are small in relation 
to the cost of litigation.  However, aggregate litigation can be justified even when 
the harms are large relative to the cost of litigation. 
 
Suppose the defendant is responsible for a mass tort that harms 100 victims by the 
amount of $2 each.  Assume that the evidence of tortious conduct is so strong that 
the victim will win his lawsuit with certainty, and the cost of bringing a lawsuit is 
$100.  The reason the cost of suit is $100 is that even though the plaintiff will win 
he must still gather the evidence and present it with at least a moderate level of 
skill to a court. 
 
It should be clear under these assumptions that no individual victim will have an 
incentive to bring a suit, since the net reward from a lawsuit is $2 - $100 = -$98.  
In this case, aggregate litigation (the class action device) is necessary in order to 
internalize to the tortfeasor the harms imposed on victims.  In the absence of the 
class action device, no victim would find it in his interest to bring a lawsuit, and 
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the injurer would not be required to pay for the harms imposed on victims.  
Realizing that he will not have to pay for the harms imposed on victims, the 
injurer would have no incentive in the future to avoid the conduct that imposed 
the harm.  Again, we observe the underdeterrence outcome. 
 
Suppose the harm to each individual is $200.  Now, each victim will find it 
rewarding to bring a lawsuit.  If a victim decides not to sue, he suffers a loss of 
$100.  If he decides to sue, he receives a net gain of $200 - $100 = $100. 
 
Aggregate litigation is no longer necessary in this scenario, where harms are large 
relative to the cost of litigation, in order to induce a victim to bring a lawsuit 
against the mass tortfeasor.  However, the underdeterrence outcome is still 
possible, and may be probable.  Consider the victim’s incentives again.  If he is 
the first to bring a suit, he must prove liability and this will cost $100.  However, 
if he waits for another victim to sue first, he may be able to avoid the cost of 
proving liability, and his litigation costs fall to (let us assume) $10. 
 
Now we have a more complicated set of payoffs from litigation.  To explore the 
incentives, and to identify the gains from aggregate litigation, assume that 
aggregate litigation (class action) is not available.  If both parties sue 
simultaneously (in different courts), each gets a net reward of $100.  If one victim 
waits for the other one to sue first, the first one gets a payoff of $100, the second 
one gets a payoff of $190.  If neither sues, the payoff to each is zero, which means 
that each suffers the loss of $200 without compensation. 
 
The strategy of suing yields the payoffs of $100 (if others sue simultaneously) or 
$100 (if you sue alone).  The strategy of waiting yields the payoffs $190 (if the 
other victim sues first) or 0 (if no one sues).  The payoffs can be described in the 
following matrix. 
 
                                                                  Sue   Don’t Sue 
 
                          Sue     100, 100                    100, 190 
 
                      Don’t Sue                        190, 100                        0, 0 
 
 
With this payoff structure, the outcome “Sue, Don’t Sue” is the one that appears 
likely to result (the Nash equilibrium).  In the other two outcomes, “Sue, Sue” and 
“Don’t Sue, Don’t Sue”, one party has an incentive to switch his strategy choice.  
However, the “Sue, Don’t Sue” outcomes will involve one victim getting a lot 
more than the other. 
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The unequal outcome in the scenario in which one party sues and the other waits 
(the “Sue, Don’t Sue” equilibrium) is likely to be similar in its psychological 
effects to the famous Ultimatum Game.26  In the Ultimatum Game one party 
moves first and cuts a pie into two parts, and the second party decides whether the 
pie can be consumed or thrown away.  Although it would be rational for the 
second party to accept any division of the pie chosen by the first mover, even if 
the first mover takes almost all of the pie and leaves only crumbs for the second 
mover, in real simulations the second mover often throws away the pie if the first 
mover splits the shares unequally.27 
 
The psychology of fairness illustrated in the Ultimatum Game may play a role in 
litigation outcomes in mass tort settings.  In the most likely outcome in the 
absence of the class action device (or some method of aggregating claims), the 
“Sue, Don’t Sue” equilibrium, the actor that sues first will feel as if he is the loser 
relative to the actor who waits.  He may correctly view himself as being used by 
the actor who waits to sue second.  That perception may lead the first actor to 
decide never to sue first.  If both parties are led by the psychological demand for 
fair outcomes to adopt a policy of not suing first, then the “Don’t Sue, Don’t Sue” 
outcome becomes the one that is frequently realized.  Both parties wait to sue, 
which may result in weaker cases when they finally decide to go to court. 
 
If the scenario described here were repeated, the parties could rotate in and out of 
the first mover position, and there would be a sense that being the one who sues 
first is not playing the sucker’s role.  But a mass tort is unlikely to be replayed 
many times.  It is a one shot scenario, which takes place in a setting in which the 
distributional consequences of suing first are obvious. 
 
The demand-for-fairness problem suggests that aggregate litigation (class action) 
may be a powerful means of avoiding the underdeterrence outcome even when the 
harm to the victim is large relative to the cost of litigation.  These two scenarios – 
                                                 
26 See, e.g., http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ultimatum_game (“The ultimatum game is an 
experimental economics game in which two parties interact anonymously and only once, so 
reciprocation is not an issue. The first player proposes how to divide a sum of money with the 
second party. If the second player rejects this division, neither gets anything. If the second accepts, 
the first gets his demand and the second gets the rest.”); Gale, J., Binmore, K.G., and Samuelson, 
L., Learning to be Imperfect: The Ultimatum Game, 8 Games and Economic Behavior 56–90 
(1995). 
27 See, e.g., Rachel T. A. Croson, Information in Ultimatum Games: An Experimental Study, 30 J. 
Econ. Behavior & Organization 197, 209 (1996); Hessel Oosterbeek, Randolph Sloof, and Gijs 
van de Kuilen, Cultural Differences in Ultimatum Game Experiments: Evidence from a Meta-
Analysis, 7 Experimental Economics 171 (2004). 
 12
cost of litigation small relative to harm, and cost of litigation large relative to 
harm – illustrate the positive welfare gains that are offered by aggregate litigation. 
  
The Fraud Problem 
 
In addition to avoiding the underdeterrence outcome in mass tort settings, 
aggregate litigation introduces some socially undesirable incentives.  The most 
obvious is the incentive to include fraudulent claims. 
 
If a class is formed with 100 victims, it will be obvious to the lawyer bringing the 
class action lawsuit that the cost of determining whether each of the 100 victims is 
truly a victim will be substantial in most settings.  Perhaps in some cases it will be 
easy to distinguish true victim from phonies.  A mass tort that leaves records, such 
as a scam that takes a $1 from the bank accounts of 100 people, should permit the 
court to separate real victims from phonies.  But in most settings records that 
would enable a court to quickly identify every real victim will not be available. 
 
Given some uncertainty over the status of an individual plaintiff in aggregate 
litigation, the class action lawyer has an incentive to include fraudulent victims in 
the class.  The lawyer knows that it is costly to determine whether any given 
victim is fraudulent.  He knows that it would not be rational, given the cost of 
checking, to examine every victim in the class to determine validity.  On the other 
hand, the gains from expanding the class are immediate to the lawyer. 
 
If, on the margin, the gain from including an additional victim in the class exceeds 
the cost, the lawyer will include an additional victim.  The gain is simply the 
additional damage amount claimed by the new victim.  The cost is the expected 
penalty that might be suffered if the victim is later discovered to be fraudulent.  If 
the only penalty is the exclusion of that new victim from the class, then there will 
be a strong incentive to include fraudulent victims.  Unless the penalty exceeds 
the gain of including an additional fraudulent victim, the lawyer will have an 
incentive to add the fraudulent claim. 
 
This incentive can generate an industry.  Suppose, for example, physician records 
are needed to prove that a victim is suffering from a certain injury, and the injury 
is one that cannot be verified precisely and at low cost.  The demand for 
fraudulent victims will then support the production of physician records to 
support fraudulent injury claims.  This has already been observed in asbestos and 
silicosis litigation.  The asbestos and silicosis cases have generated cases in which 
fraudulent claims have been added in order to boost the size of the class.28 
                                                 
28 Lester Brickman, Disparities Between Asbestosis and Silicosis Claims Generated by Litigation 
Screenings and Clinical Studies, 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 513 (2007) [hereafter Brickman, Disparities]; 
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In addition to simply boosting the total damage award, the addition of a fraudulent 
claim also enhances the likelihood of settlement.  If the defendant faces the risk of 
an enormous judgment from representing the claims of thousands of plaintiffs, it 
will feel great pressure to settle in order to avoid a bankrupting damages 
judgment.  Including fraudulent claims therefore not only enhances the aggregate 
award, it enhances the probability of a settlement. 
 
Suppose the percentage of the total judgment taken by the lawyer is α.  The total 
amount of damages for the fraudulent claims is Df.  The probability of the fraud 
being discovered is q.  If the fraud is discovered the attorney will not be able to 
collect fees from those cases, and will be required to pay a penalty S.  Under these 
assumptions, the attorney will include a subclass of fraudulent claims with total 
damages Df if 
 
     α(1-q)Df > qS , 
 
which means that the expected gain to the attorney from fraudulent claims 
exceeds the expected penalty.29  The fraud will be deterred only if the sanction is 
set so that S > α(1-q)Df/q.  In other words, the sanction for fraud should be at 
least as large as the attorney’s expected gain from the fraudulent claims, divided 
by the probability of detection. 
 
To see what this implies in terms of magnitude, suppose the attorney’s take is 20 
percent and the total number of fraudulent claims is 10,000.30  Suppose each of 
these claims seeks only $15,000 in compensation.  The probability of being 
detected is 10 percent.  Under these assumptions, plaintiffs’ attorney should be hit 
with a sanction of at least $270 million. 
 
Another perspective on the fraud problem can be gained by considering the 
demand for fraudulent victims.  Suppose the penalty is equal to zero.  Then the 
gain to the attorney from including the fraudulent subclass, under the foregoing 
assumptions, is $27 million.  At this level, the revenue from fraudulent claims 
could easily support a minor industry in the processing of false claimants.31  If the 
                                                                                                                                     
id., On the Applicability of the Silica MDL Proceeding to Asbestos Litigation, 12 Conn. Ins. L.J. 
289 (2006). 
29 A more precise description of the lawyer’s incentives would say that the lawyer will include a 
fraudulent subclass if α(1-q)Df  – C > qS, where C is the cost of generating the fraudulent subclass 
(e.g., fraudulent mass screenings).  To simplify the discussion, I have treated C as equal to zero. 
30 This is a realistic number; it is the same size (plus one) as the fraudulent silicosis class 
discovered by Judge Janis Jack in the silicosis MDL. See Freedman, supra note 11, at 16. 
31 Brickman, Disparities, supra note 27, at 519 (“To read the hundreds of thousands of chest X-
rays and pulmonary function tests generated by the litigation screenings and to produce the 
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only sanction for including fraudulent claims is the dismissal of those claims, the 
incentive to develop subclasses of fraudulent claims will remain strong.32 
 
Implications and Applications 
 
The lessons from these general considerations can be illustrated with an example.  
Let us start with the efficient invader example considered earlier.  Suppose the 
tortfeasor parks his cars in private garages without seeking consent from the 
property owners, in a setting of low transaction costs).  Assume that there is a 
litigation class of 150 victims.  100 of the victims are real victims of the garage 
invader’s conduct.  50 of the claimants are fraudulent – the invader never parked 
in their garages.  Each real victim suffered a loss of $1.  Each fraudulent victim 
suffered a loss of $0.  In each case of a real victim, the garage invader gained $10. 
What should be done? 
 
If the attorney’s lawsuit includes no claim for punitive damages, it will seek an 
aggregate judgment of $150.  This aggregate claim includes a fraudulent 
surcharge of 50%.  Interestingly, on deterrence grounds this is still too low.  The 
tortfeasor’s gain from conduct affecting the real victims was $1000.  A judgment 
of $150 would be insufficient to efficiently deter the garage invader’s market-
bypassing conduct. 
 
On the other hand, the attorney has bundled 50 fraudulent claims in a class of 150.  
This is an abuse of the legal system that should not be tolerated.  Under the 
analysis of the previous section, if the probability of fraud being detected is only 
10 percent, the sanction applied against the attorney should be at least $90. 
 
Although there is massive fraud in this example, it is not clear on economic 
grounds that the defendant should be spared having to pay the $150 judgment.  
The $150 assessment is below the $1000 that is necessary in this example to 
                                                                                                                                     
massive numbers of medical reports needed to advance the scheme plaintiffs lawyers and the 
screening companies have hired small number of doctors who share one common characteristic; 
their apparent willingness to enter into business transactions with lawyers and screening 
companies for the sale of tens of thousands of X-ray readings and diagnoses in exchange for the 
payment of millions of dollars.”)  
32 If the probability of detection is sufficiently high, plaintiffs may not have an incentive to file 
fraudulent claims.  After all, the plaintiffs’ lawyer incurs some cost in filing a claim, supra note 
29.  If the return from a fraudulent claim were equal to zero, then the lawyers would lose money 
on fraudulent claims.  Thus, dismissing fraudulent claims, without penalizing lawyers, may 
eliminate the incentive to file such claims if the probability of detection is sufficiently high.  An 
alternative approach to discouraging fraud is the mandatory summary judgment proposal, see 
David Rosenberg & Randy Kozel, Solving the Nuisance-Value Settlement Problem: Mandatory 
Summary Judgment, 90 Virginia Law Review 1849 (2004).  The mandatory summary judgment 
could be successful at deterring fraud if the probability of detection is sufficiently high. 
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appropriately deter the tortfeasor’s invasive conduct.  The best practical solution 
on deterrence grounds would require the tortfeasor to pay the entire judgment, 
with the fraudulent excess of $50 going to the state. The plaintiffs’ lawyer should 
be assessed a penalty of $90. 
 
The key lesson of this example is that the goals of deterring tortious conduct and 
fraudulent litigation can be separated and pursued through different instruments.  
In the efficient invader example, the proper regulatory goal with respect to the 
defendant is complete deterrence.  This implies that the damage judgment should 
be no less than the amount required to eliminate gain from the defendant’s 
market-bypassing conduct.  The complete deterrence goal also applies to the 
plaintiffs’ lawyer’s inclusion of fraudulent claims.  The appropriate penalty 
against the lawyer eliminates any expectation of gain from that strategy. 
 
The goals of regulating injury causing conduct and deterring fraudulent litigation 
can be pursued separately.  This implies that a finding of fraud on the part of the 
plaintiffs’ attorney does not immediately imply that the defendant should be 
relieved of some part of the damage claim.  If the defendant’s conduct is the type 
that should be completely deterred, then a finding of fraud does not immediately 
imply a reduction of the judgment.  On the other hand, if the defendant’s conduct 
is the type for which the internalization goal is appropriate – for example, cases of 
ordinary negligence rather than expropriation – then any finding of fraud among 
claims should immediately lead to a reduction in the damage judgment. 
 
The upshot of this analysis is that defendants in mass tort cases should be 
prioritized according to their degree of culpability.  For those defendants that are 
at guilty of unambiguously malicious conduct, such as deliberately exposing 
consumers or employees to a substantial and hidden risk of injury, the need to 
worry about overdeterrence lessens greatly, and the more important problem to 
avoid is underdeterrence.  Of course, plaintiffs’ lawyers who bundle fraudulent 
claims should be sanctioned in these cases.  However, it may not be appropriate 
on deterrence grounds to set the portion of the judgment covering the marginal or 
fraudulent plaintiffs at zero.  It would be inappropriate to award compensation to 
fraudulent plaintiffs, but the amounts claimed by those plaintiffs can be 
transferred to the state as part of a punitive award. 
 
For defendants whose conduct can be described as negligent (in contrast to 
reckless or intentional), there is a valid overdeterrence concern.  The plaintiffs’ 
lawyers should be sanctioned for bundling fraudulent claims.  In addition, the 
defendants should not be required to pay damages covering the claims of 
fraudulent plaintiffs.  In addition, the claims of marginal plaintiffs should be 
examined carefully to avoid overcompensation. 
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Application to Asbestos Litigation 
 
In light of the apparent incentive to include fraudulent claims in mass tort settings, 
a policy of sanctioning plaintiffs’ attorneys who bundle fraudulent claims would 
be desirable.  The plaintiffs’ attorney should be considered responsible for the 
quality of claims he represents.  If an attorney is permitted to avoid responsibility 
by arguing that he had no knowledge of the fraudulent claims, then attorneys who 
knowingly bundle fraudulent claims will find no obstacles in their way. 
 
Judge Janis Jack dismissed the fraudulent claims in the silicosis litigation, but the 
incentive for fraud will not be removed unless there are penalties applied to 
attorneys who bring fraudulent classes. Since fraud is difficult to detect, the 
penalties should be substantial – no less than the revenue anticipated from the 
fraudulent claims divided by the probability of detection.  Thus, if an attorney 
bundles 10,000 fraudulent claims of $10,000 each, charges a 30% contingency 
fee, and faces a detection risk of 10%, the minimal sanction for his fraud is $270 
million. 
 
Admittedly, it may be difficult to determine the probability of detection.  
However, since the sanction level is determined at its minimum, a court that 
applied a sanction for fraud would need only to determine an upper-bound 
estimate of the probability of detection.  If the lawyer’s expected revenue from 
fraud is adjusted for the upper-bound detection estimate, there should be no basis 
to complain that the sanction is inappropriate. 
 
In light of the incentive for fraud, courts should permit defendants in mass tort 
litigation to challenge the validity of claims and to require an audit of the 
plaintiff’s class.  The audit could be based on a random sample, or, if sampling is 
not feasible, statistical modeling.  In order to regulate incentives to seek an audit, 
the cost of the audit should be shouldered by the party who “loses” the audit.  If 
the defendant requests an audit of the claims, and the audit fails to find evidence 
of substantial fraud, the defendant should bear the cost of the audit.  If, on the 
other hand, the audit finds evidence of substantial fraud, the audit cost should be 
shifted to the plaintiffs’ attorney. 
 
The cases involving intentional or reckless exposure to risk should be treated 
differently from those involving claims of negligence only.  Where the evidence 
strongly supports a finding of intentional or reckless conduct, courts should 
separate deterrence and compensation concerns in asbestos litigation.  Although 
fraudulent claims should never be compensated, marginal claims should be 
treated with more leniency where the defendant has engaged in reckless conduct.  
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In addition, the portion of the judgment that would cover the claims of fraudulent 
plaintiffs could be transferred to the state rather than deducted from the total 
damage judgment, provided that the total damage judgment is well within the 
range of an economically appropriate penalty. 
 
Admittedly, this implication may seem less useful in the asbestos context, where 
there is a long lag (e.g., 20 years) between exposure and the filing of a claim.  
However, when businesses make decisions to expose people to risks that may 
materialize many years in the future, those decisions should be presumed to be 
rational.  It is appropriate then to impose a penalty that eliminates gains from 
malicious or reckless conduct, even if the penalty has to be imposed many years 
after the conduct. 
 
The following numerical example illustrates the function of a gain eliminating 
penalty in the most culpable cases of asbestos exposure.  Suppose the employer 
knowingly exposed 10,000 employees to asbestos, at levels and for periods that 
were likely to cause the most severe asbestos-related diseases.  The exposure was 
so severe that it raised the annual risk of death by 2/10,000.  Assume the 
employer knew about the risk and refused to communicate the risk to employees.  
If the annual wage premium for an incremental death risk of 1/10,000 was (during 
the time of exposure) $750, then the employer’s gain from refusing the 
communicate risk would have been $15 million per year.  Assume that the risk 
exposure continued for ten years. 
 
The employer’s gain is equal to the savings (due to not having to pay the wage 
risk premium) of $15 million per year over ten years, which is $150 million.  
However, this approach ignores the interest earned on the savings.  To take the 
time value of money into account, let us consider the employer’s incentives 
looking forward.  Suppose in “year zero”, the employer is looking at the stream of 
gains he gets over the following ten years from employing workers without 
informing them of the asbestos exposure risk.  The gain to the employer looking 
forward in year zero is equal to the present value of a stream providing $15 
million per year over ten years.  Suppose the rate of interest is 5%.  Then the 
present value of the gain to the employer in year zero is $115.8 million.33  
Suppose, now, that the damage awards from tort suits do not appear until year 30 
(and, to simplify, assume all of the tort suits are filed in year 30).  With an interest 
rate of 5%, the present value of a liability bill of D will be .23D in year zero when 
the employer is deciding whether his plan is profitable.34  The employer’s plan 
                                                 
33 For an interest rate r, the present value of a stream offering $1 every year for 10 years 
(beginning next year) is (1/r)[1-(1/(1+r))10].  Multiply this discount factor by $150 million with r 
= .05, and the answer is $115.8 million. 
34 The discount factor is (1/(1+r))30, which is equal to .23 when r = .05. 
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will therefore be profitable, looking forward in year zero, as long as $115.8 
million is greater than .23D.  Thus, in order to set the total liability at level that 
deters the employer’s plan, the liability bill in year 30 must be no less than $503 
million.35  If the compensatory awards given in year 30 (and onward) amount to 
less, assessed in year zero on present value terms, than $503 million, then the 
awards will be insufficient on deterrence grounds.  This illustrates the scenario in 
which it might be desirable to decouple the employer’s damage payment and the 
compensation received by plaintiffs.  Fraudulent victims would not receive 
compensation, but the employer may not receive a deduction on his damage bill. 
 
The cases of intentional or reckless conduct have largely been run through the 
courts and the remaining defendants today involve conduct that may have been 
negligent at worst.  For these cases, it is extremely important to avoid the 
overdeterrence problem.  Plaintiffs’ attorneys should be sanctioned for fraud; the 
dismissal of fraudulent claims is not enough to deter fraudulent claim bundling.  
In addition, marginal claims should be examined carefully to avoid any 
imposition of excessive damages against defendants.  The efforts by judges to 
prioritize claims according to the severity of injury are entirely appropriate in 
view of the low culpability of most asbestos defendants today.36 
 
Conclusion 
 
The asbestos crisis has revealed some of the benefits and costs of aggregate 
litigation.  In addition to economies of scale, aggregate litigation avoids the 
underdeterrence problem that is likely to arise in mass tort settings.  However, 
aggregate litigation also introduces an incentive to bundle fraudulent claims.  It is 
important to separate the deterrence principles that apply to the conduct of 
defendants from the deterrence principles that apply to fraudulent claimants. 
                                                 
35 The employer’s plan is profitable only if $115.8 million > .23D.  It follows that the minimum 
penalty is D > $115.8m/.23 = $503 million. 
36 On prioritization efforts within the courts, see Freedman, supra note 11. 
